We study the notion of excludability in repeated games with vector payoffs, when one of the players is restricted to strategies with bounded computational capacity. We show that a closed set is excludable by Player 2 when Player 1 is restricted to using only bounded-recall strategies if and only if it does not contain a convex approachable set. We provide partial results when Player 1 is restricted to using strategies that can be implemented by automata. 1. Introduction. In a seminal paper, Blackwell [2] introduced and studied the notions of approachability and excludability in repeated games with vector payoffs. These notions are analogues to the max-min and the min-max levels in repeated games with scalar payoffs.
1. Introduction. In a seminal paper, Blackwell [2] introduced and studied the notions of approachability and excludability in repeated games with vector payoffs. These notions are analogues to the max-min and the min-max levels in repeated games with scalar payoffs.
In repeated games with vector payoffs the outcome of players' actions is not a scalar utility for each player, but rather a vector in some Euclidean space. A set of vectors is approachable by Player 1 if he has a strategy that guarantees, with arbitrarily high probability, that the average (vector) payoff is asymptotically close to the set, regardless of the strategy employed by Player 2. A set is excludable by Player 2 if she has a strategy that guarantees, with arbitrarily high probability, that the average payoff is asymptotically bounded away from the set, regardless of the strategy used by Player 1.
Blackwell [2] provided a geometric condition that guarantees that a set is approachable, and proved that any convex set is either approachable by Player 1, or excludable by Player 2. Hou [5] and Spinat [14] fully characterized the family of approachable sets. Both proved that if a closed set is minimally (w.r.t. set inclusion) approachable, then it satisfies Blackwell's geometric condition. Vieille [15] studied the notions of weak approachability and weak excludability, which were also introduced by Blackwell [2] , and proved that any set is either weakly approachable or weakly excludable. For partial results on weak approachability for two-dimensional games where both players have two actions, see Hou [4] .
Our objective is to study repeated games with vector payoffs when one of the players is restricted to strategies with bounded computational capacity. Two classes of such strategies were extensively studied in the literature: those that can be implemented by finite automata (see, e.g., Neyman [9] , Rubinstein [11] , Ichiishi et al. [6] ), and those with bounded recall-that is, strategies that may condition only on actions that were played in the last t stages, for some fixed integer t (see, e.g., Lehrer [7] , Aumann and Sorin [1] ).
In a companion paper (Lehrer and Solan [8] ), we study the notions of approachability with automata and with bounded-recall strategies. We characterized the sets that are approachable by Player 1 if he may only use strategies that can be implemented by automata, or bounded-recall strategies (and Player 2 is not restricted). We proved that the following three statements are equivalent for closed sets.
• F is approachable with automata by Player 1.
• F is approachable with bounded-recall strategies by Player 1.
• F contains a convex set that is approachable by Player 1.
In the present paper we concentrate on the notions of excludability against automata and against bounded-recall strategies. A set is excludable against automata (respectively, against bounded-recall strategies) by Player 2 if she has a strategy that ensures that when Player 1 plays a finite automaton (respectively, a bounded-recall strategy), the long-run average payoff is bounded away from the set.
Our first result is a complete characterization of the sets that are excludable against bounded-recall strategies: A closed set is excludable against bounded-recall strategies by a player if and only if it is not approachable with bounded-recall strategies by that player-namely, if and only if it does not contain any convex set that is approachable by the player.
We then provide partial results concerning sets that are excludable against automata. We do not know whether any set that is not approachable with automata by Player 1 is excludable against automata by Player 2. Solving this problem will reveal whether the two notions related to strategies with bounded computational capacity are equivalent.
The model and the main results.
In this section we define the model of repeated games with vector payoffs, and two types of bounded computational capacity strategies. We then define the notion of excludability against such strategies, and finally, we state our results.
Repeated games with vector payoffs.
A two-player repeated game with vector payoffs is a triplet I J U , where I and J are finite sets of actions of the players, and U = u i j i∈I j∈J is a d-dimensional vectorpayoff matrix: u i j ∈ d for every i ∈ I and j ∈ J . We assume w.l.o.g. that all the payoffs are in the unit ball of d . We denote by I and J the players' mixed action sets (that is, the sets of probability distributions over I and J , respectively). By and we denote the sets of mixed strategies in the repeated game of the Players 1 and 2, respectively.
The pair i k j k denotes the joint action played by Players 1 and 2 at stage k. The average (vector) payoff up to stage n isx n = n k=1 u i k j k /n. A bounded-recall strategy is a strategy that is t-bounded recall for some t ∈ . We denote by BR the set of all bounded-recall strategies of Player 1.
A (nondeterministic) automaton A is given by (i) a finite set of states; (ii) a probability distribution over the set of states, according to which the initial state is chosen; (iii) a finite set of inputs; (iv) a finite set of outputs; (v) a function that assigns to every state a probability distribution over outputs; and finally (vi) a transition rule that assigns to every state and every input a probability distribution over states.
When the set of outputs coincides with the set I of actions of Player 1, and the set of inputs coincides with the set I × J of action pairs, an automaton implements a strategy of Player 1 as follows. The initial state of the automaton is chosen according to the initial distribution given in (ii). At every stage, as a function of the current state an action of Player 1 is chosen by the probability distribution given in (v), and a new state is chosen as a function of the pair of actions played (by both players), according to the probability distribution given in (vi).
A denotes the set of Player 1's strategies that can be implemented by an automaton. Observe that every t-bounded-recall strategy can be implemented by an automaton with I × J t states. Blackwell [2] defined the notion of excludability in repeated games with vector payoffs. A set F is excludable by Player 2 if she can guarantee with arbitrarily high probability that the average payoff is asymptotically bounded away from F . Definition 2.1 (Blackwell 1956) . A set F is excludable by Player 2 if there exists a strategy ∈ such that
where P is the probability distribution over the space of infinite plays induced by the pair . We are interested in studying when a given set is excludable by Player 2, provided that Player 1 is restricted to using bounded-recall strategies, or strategies that can be implemented by automata. Definition 2.2.
(1) A set F is excludable against bounded-recall strategies by Player 2 if there exists a strategy ∈ such that
The set is excludable against automata if a similar condition holds when BR is replaced by A . 1 One could replace the virtual memory used in the first t stages by t functions r I × J r−1 → I for r = 1 t; the function r is used to choose the action at stage r. Our results hold with this more general definition of a bounded-recall strategy.
Observe that in this definition N may depend on the strategy used by Player 1, whereas in Definition 2.1 it does not. If N is required to be independent of the strategy employed by Player 1, excludability against bounded-recall strategies (or against automata) turns out to be equivalent to excludability. Nevertheless, it is desirable that N depends only on the size of the memory of the strategy (or on the size of the automaton), and not on the strategy itself. Studying excludability against bounded computational capacity strategies under this stronger definition is left for future research.
Results and examples.
To present our result concerning excludability against bounded-recall strategies, we need the notion of approachability. A set F is approachable if Player 1 can guarantee with arbitrarily high probability that the long-run average payoff will be arbitrarily close to F . Formally, Definition 2.3 (Blackwell 1956 ). A set F is approachable by Player 1 if there exists a strategy ∈ such that
In this case we say that approaches F . Blackwell [2] provided a geometric condition that guarantees that a set is approachable.
2.4.1. Excludability against bounded-recall strategies. Our main result concerning excludability against bounded-recall strategies, which is proved in §3.1, is the following. The dual notion to excludability against bounded-recall strategies is approachability with bounded-recall strategies.
Definition 2.4 (Lehrer and Solan 2003).
A set F is approachable with bounded-recall strategies by Player 1 if for every > 0 there exists a bounded-recall strategy that approaches B F . We note that a set cannot be both approachable with bounded-recall strategies and excludable against boundedrecall strategies.
Together with Lehrer and Solan [8, Proposition 2], Theorem 2.1 implies the following characterization of sets that are excludable against bounded-recall strategies. • F is not approachable with bounded-recall strategies by Player 1.
• F does not contain a convex set which is approachable by Player 1.
As Hou [5] and Spinat [14] provided a geometric characterization to approachable sets, Corollary 2.1 provides a geometric characterization for sets that are excludable against bounded-recall strategies.
If in addition F is convex, then we have the following result.
Corollary 2.2. A convex set is excludable by Player 2 if and only if it is excludable against bounded-recall strategies by Player 2.
Indeed, by Blackwell [2] a convex set F is either approachable by Player 1 or excludable by Player 2. In the former case, because F is convex, it contains a convex set that is approachable by Player 1, so that by Corollary 2.1 it is not excludable against bounded-recall strategies by Player 2. In the latter case, because it is excludable by Player 2, it is in particular excludable against bounded-recall strategies by Player 2.
Excludability against automata.
We now present our results concerning excludability against automata. We start with some definitions.
For every pair p q of mixed actions, denote by u p q = i j p i u i j q j the expected vector payoff. This is the expected stage-payoff when Player 1 plays the mixed action p and Player 2 plays the mixed action q.
For any mixed action q of Player 2, denote H q = u p q p is a mixed action of Player 1
When Player 2 plays the mixed action q, the expected stage-payoff is always in H q , regardless of the mixed action chosen by Player 1.
Definition 2.5. Let x be a point in a set F . x is sharp in F if for every > 0 there is some mixed action q of Player 2 such that H q ∩ F ⊆ B x .
Because the family {His a mixed action of Player 2} depends on the game, the property of being sharp is relative to the game.
A point x is sharp in F if for every > 0 Player 2 has a stationary strategy that guarantees that the long-run average payoff is either -close to x, or outside F .
Example 2.1. Consider the following game, where both players have two actions, payoffs are two dimensional, and the payoff matrix is
where q L is the probability that Player 2 plays the left column,
The following figure ( Figure 1 ) depicts a few representatives of the family H q 0 ≤ q ≤ 1 (in light lines), together with two sets (in gray line).
The set F 1 has no sharp points, while all the points in F 2 are sharp. Our main result concerning excludability against automata, which is proved in §3.2, is the following. Figure 1 (B) is excludable against automata by Player 2. To explain the main ideas in the proof of Theorem 2.2, we elaborate on Example 2.1.
Example 2.1-continued. Let F 2 = 0 0 2 2 ∪ 0 0 1 −1 be the set that appears in Figure 1 (B). One can verify that F 2 satisfies Blackwell's [2] geometric condition, and therefore it is approachable by Player 1. Theorem 2.2 F 2 is excludable against automata by Player 2. We now explain how to construct a strategy of Player 2 that ensures the long-run average payoff remains far from F 2 , provided that Player 1 uses strategies that can be implemented by automata.
Let R * (respectively, L * ) be the stationary strategy of Player 2 in which she always plays the right column (respectively, left column). If Player 2 uses one of these strategies, the evolution of the state of the automaton that implements Player 1's strategy follows a Markov chain. Thus, the average payoff converges to a limit. Because H R ∩ F 2 consists only of the point 1 −1 , when Player 2 uses R * , this limit is either out of F 2 , or equal to 1 −1 . Similarly, because H L ∩ F 2 = 2 2 , when Player 2 uses L * the limit is either out of F 2 , or equal to 2 2 .
Player 2 is going to play in blocks whose length is polynomial in k. In each block Player 2 follows either R * or L * . If the average payoff within block k is far from F 2 , Player 2 plays in block k + 1 the same strategy he played along block k. If the average payoff within block k is close to F 2 , Player 2 switches in block k + 1 to the other strategy.
Let us now verify that the average payoff is asymptotically far from F 2 . If the limit payoff is far from F 2 , with high probability the average payoff within the block is far from F 2 . The definition of the strategy implies that Player 2 will keep on playing the same stationary strategy, so that the long-run average payoff converges to the limit, which is outside F 2 . Otherwise, Player 2 alternates between playing L * (within such blocks the average payoff is close to 2 2 ) and playing R * (within such blocks the average payoff is close to 1 −1 ). Therefore, the long-run average payoff converges to
, which is outside F 2 . In general, the length of block k slowly increases with k. It increases, so that whichever automaton Player 1 uses, for k is sufficiently large, the average payoff within block k is close to the limit payoff. It increases slowly, so that the ratio between the length of block k and the total length of all preceding blocks goes to zero. This property is needed so that the average payoff will indeed be close to the desired convex combination.
To make the discussion complete, we briefly mention the notion of excludability with a bounded computational capacity strategy. A set is excludable with a bounded-recall strategy (respectively, with automata) by Player 1 if Player 1 has a bounded-recall strategy (respectively, a strategy that can be implemented by an automaton) that ensures the long-run average payoff remains far from the set. Theorem 1 in Lehrer and Solan [8] implies the following proposition, which makes the connection between excludability with bounded capacity and approachability. 3 there is a constant C > 0 such that for every two states s s , every > 0, and every n ∈ ,
where s t =s = 1 if the state at stage t is s and 0 otherwise, and = s s is the (unique) invariant distribution.
3.1. Excludability against bounded-recall strategies. Here we prove Theorem 2.1, which states that a closed set that does not contain a convex set that is approachable by Player 1 is excludable against bounded-recall strategies by Player 2.
The structure of the proof is as follows. We first prove in Proposition 3.1 that for every given bounded-recall strategy m of Player 1 there is a strategy = m of Player 2 such that under m the long-run average payoff remains far from F with probability at least 1/2. We then show in Lemma 3.2 that the collection m m ∈ BR can be taken to be countable. Finally, we construct a strategy * that ensures that the long-run average payoff remains far from F . The strategy * plays in blocks; each might be finite or infinite. A block ends once the average payoff along the block is close to F . If the average payoff is never close to F , the block never ends (i.e., it is an infinite block). In each block * follows one of the countably many strategies in the collection.
* is designed in such a way that if it happens that there are infinitely many finite blocks, then each strategy in the collection is followed infinitely often (that is, in infinitely many blocks).
When Player 1 follows the bounded-recall strategy m , in each block where m is played there is a probability of at least 1/2 that the average payoff will never be close to F (so that the block is infinite). The probability that there will be infinitely many finite blocks is zero. Indeed, because m is played in infinitely many blocks, and in each the probability that the block is finite is at most 1/2, therefore, with probability one, one of the blocks is infinite, which means that the average payoff is far from F all along that block. This ensures that F is excludable.
We will need the following simple observation, which holds because under the Hausdorff metric, the collection of compact sets is compact, and the limit of approachable sets is approachable. An element of I × J t will be called a memory. When Player 1 plays a t-bounded-recall strategy, we denote by m n his memory at stage n, that is, the t-history composed of the t pairs of actions played in stages n − t n − t + 1 n − 1. As Player 2 observes past play, she knows m n . The next proposition asserts that as long as the closed set F does not contain any convex approachable set, for every fixed bounded-recall strategy of Player 1 there is a reply of Player 2 that ensures the long-run average payoff remains far from F with nonnegligible probability.
Proposition 3.1. Let F be a closed set that does not contain any convex approachable set. There exists > 0 such that for every bounded-recall strategy of Player 1 (without an initial memory) there is a strategy of Player 2 and an integer N * that satisfies
Observe that in Equation (2) the quantity is independent of the strategy of Player 1, while N * does depend on it. When the length of the memory is fixed, the number of initial memories is finite, so that N * need not depend on the initial memory.
Proof of Proposition 3.1. Let F be a closed set that does not contain any convex approachable set. By Lemma 3.1 there is > 0 such that B F 6 does not contain any convex approachable set. By Lehrer and Solan ([8, Proposition 3]), B F 6 is not approachable with bounded-recall strategies by Player 1.
We fix throughout a t-bounded-recall strategy of Player 1 (without the initial memory) and proceed in five steps.
Step 1 L − 1. We denote by the collection of all irreducible sets. When we say that m ∈ , we mean that m ∈ M, for some M ∈ .
The definition implies that if m n ∈ , all subsequent memories belong to the same irreducible set. Letˆ be the strategy of Player 2 in which she plays all actions with equal probability at every stage, irrespective of past play. By followingˆ , Player 2 ensures that the play moves in a finite number of stages to a memory that belongs to an irreducible set. Formally,
Moreover, by followingˆ Player 2 guarantees that the play reaches any memory in an irreducible set, provided it starts at that set. Formally,
Step 2. Finding Good Play Paths. An infinite sequence h = i 1 j 1 i 2 j 2 ∈ I × J is called a play path. Fix m ∈ . Because B F 6 is not approachable by bounded-recall strategies, it is in particular not approachable by m . Therefore, there is a strategy m of Player 2 such that on a set of play paths with positive probability the average payoff is infinitely often far from F by more than 6 . Denoting
As the payoff space is bounded, for each play path in H * there is a vector c ∈ B F 6 such that d x n c < infinitely often. In particular, for every initial memory m ∈ there is a vector c m ∈ B F 6 such that the set of the play paths along which the average payoff is infinitely often -close to c m has a positive probability. That is,
Denote by H m the set of play paths that satisfy lim inf n→ d x n c m < .
Step 3. Empirical Distribution of Actions. For every play path h, every memory m ∈ I × J t , every action j ∈ J , and every two positive integers k and l that satisfy k < l, denote
k→l h i i∈I is the empirical distribution of actions of Player 1 between stages k and l played after the memory m when Player 2 plays j. This quantity is defined whenever the denominator does not vanish.
Let N m j k→l h = # k ≤ n ≤ l m n = m j n = j be the number of times the memory m is followed by the action j of Player 2. The average payoff along h between stages k and l is given by
If along h the action j appears after the memory m only finitely many times, we can choose k sufficiently large such that along h the memory m is never followed by the action j after stage k. Therefore, for every play path h there is a stage k such that
Set
1→l h = Because the choices of the two players are conditionally independent,
Step 4. Periodic Partial Histories. Fix m * ∈ I × J t , and fix h ∈ H m * ∩ H 1 . By (5) and (8) l. By (A3) and (A5) it follows that the average payoff along h between stages k and l is in B c m 2 . The set of memories that occur along h between stages k and l is
The partial history h between stages k and l induces a Markov chain over the space M k→l h : if the current memory is m = i 1 j 1 i t j t , the new memory is m = i 2 j 2 i t j t i j with probability
This is the empirical frequency of the pair i j after the memory m along h between stages k and l.
(A4) implies that this Markov chain is irreducible, and its invariant distribution is actually given by
A second Markov chain over the space M k→l h is the following one. If the current state is m = i 1 j 1 i t j t , the new memory is m = i 2 j 2 i t j t i j with probability
Provided is sufficiently small, (A2) implies that this Markov chain is irreducible. Denote its invariant distribution by . Observe that this is the Markov chain that is induced over M k→l h when Player 1 follows and Player 2 follows the t-bounded-recall strategyˆ that is defined bŷ
If is sufficiently small, by virtue of (A1), (A2), and O'Cinneide ([10, Theorem 1]) we have
Provided the initial memory is in M k→l h , the long-run average payoff under
By (A2), (A5), (11) , and (9), the difference between Y and Z (see Equation (6)) is at most + . Because Z ∈ B c m * , and because is sufficiently small, it follows that Y ∈ B c m * 3 , as desired.
Step 5. Constructing the Desired Strategy. We here construct a strategy that ensures the average payoff remains far from F when Player 1 follows .
• Phase 1: followsˆ until a memory in is reached. Denote by m * ∈ that memory. Fix h ∈ H m * ∩ H 1 , let > 0 be sufficiently small, and let k and l be two positive integers such that (11) and (A1)-(A5) hold.
• Phase 2: keeps followingˆ until a memory in M k→l h is reached.
• Phase 3: From that stage on, followsˆ . Let us verify that (2) holds for . Indeed, by (3) there is N 1 * ∈ such that with probability greater than 5/6 Phase 1 ends before stage N 1 * . By (4) there is N 2 * > N 1 * such that with probability greater than 4/6 Phase 2 ends before stage N * 2 . Equation (1) implies that there is N * > N 2 * such that with probability at least 1 2 , the average payoff up to stage n is within d c m * 4 for every n ≥ N * . Because c m * ∈ B F 6 , the desired result follows.
Remark 3.1. Note that the strategy defined in the proof of Proposition 3.1 is asymptotically t-bounded recall. That is, with probability 1 there is a stage such that after that stage, Player 2 follows a t-bounded-recall strategy.
Our next step is to prove that there is a countable collection of strategies of Player 2 such that for every bounded-recall strategy of Player 1, one of the strategies in this collection ensures that the long-run average payoff will be far from F .
Lemma 3.2.
There is > 0 and a sequence l N l l∈ , where for every l ∈ , l is a strategy of Player 2 and N l ∈ , such that for every bounded-recall strategy (without an initial memory) there is an index l ∈ such that Equation (2) is satisfied for l , and N l . Proof. Let be given by Proposition 3.1. Fix t ∈ and a t-bounded-recall strategy (without an initial memory). Let be the strategy we constructed in the proof of Proposition 3.1 for , and let N * be the corresponding finite horizon that appears in (2) . Let D be the set of t-bounded recall strategies such that the support of · m and · m coincide for every m ∈ I × J t . For every > 0 define B to be the set of all the t-bounded recall strategies ∈ D that satisfy 1 − i m / i m < for every i ∈ I and m ∈ I × J t . 5 We claim that if is small enough, then for each ∈ B , Equation (2) It follows that under m , with probability at least 1 2 the average payoff remains out of B F from stage N * and on. We let = > 0 sufficiently small that both (C1) and (C2) hold. . We conclude that a countable union of sets of the kind B covers all the t-bounded-recall strategies, and therefore there is a countable collection of these sets whose union covers the set of all bounded-recall strategies. The result follows.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 2.1. We will use Lehrer and Solan [8, Theorem 1] , which states that a closed set is approachable by bounded-recall strategies if and only if it contains a convex approachable set.
Proof of Theorem 2.1. Let F be a closed set that does not contain the convex hull of any approachable set. Let and l N l l∈ be given by Lemma 3.2. Then, for every bounded-recall strategy m of Player 1 there is l that excludes m from B F with probability greater than 1 2 . We now construct the strategy * of Player 2 that was described above, and which excludes F against every bounded-recall strategy with probability 1.
Let r = r 1 r 2 → 2 be a 1-1 and onto function. * plays in blocks of varying (possibly infinite) size. In block k, * follows * r 1 k . Block k terminates once the following two conditions are simultaneously satisfied: (i) the length of the block is at least N r 1 k , and (ii) the average payoff within this block is in B F
. Once block k terminates, block k + 1 begins. The second coordinate r 2 ensures that for each l there are infinitely many ks that satisfy r 1 k = l.
We now verify that * excludes F , provided Player 1 uses a bounded-recall strategy, say m . Suppose that ∈ B l l . We argue that with probability one there are finitely many blocks. Indeed, consider the event 1 that all blocks are finite. On this event there are infinitely many blocks in which l is followed. By (2) the probability that such a block is finite is at most 1 2 . Because play in different blocks is conditionally independent, P 1 = 0, as claimed.
This implies that
It follows that F is excludable against bounded-recall strategies, as desired.
Excludability against automata.
Here we prove Theorem 2.2, which states that any closed set that does not contain the convex hull of its sharp points is excludable against automata.
Proof of Theorem 2.2. Let F be a closed set that does not contain the convex hull of its sharp points. Thus, there are sharp points x 1 x L in F and nonnegative numbers 1 L such that
Step 1. A Definition of a Strategy. We now define a strategy * that plays in blocks with increasing length. Below we prove that this strategy guarantees that the average payoff remains far from F .
• Before start of play, choose a number uniformly from the interval 3/4 .
• There are L types of blocks, one for each l = 1 L. The length of block k is k + k 4 , and its type is denoted by l k . A block of type l is referred to as an l-block.
• For every l, at every stage of an l-block * plays the mixed action q l .
• The type of the first block is l = 1.
• The type of block k + 1 is determined as follows.
-If the average payoff within block k is not in B x l k , the type of block k + 1 is the same as the type of block k.
-Otherwise, denote by n the last stage of block k, and by m l the overall number of stages up to stage n spent in l-blocks (in particular,
When Player 1 follows an automaton and Player 2 follows the stationary strategy q l the long-run average payoff exists. Provided a block is sufficiently long, if the limit average payoff is in B x l , then with high probability the average payoff along an l-block is in B x l , while if the limit average payoff is outside B x l , then with high probability the average payoff along the l-block is outside B x l . When the average payoff is on the boundary of B x l , the average payoff along the l-block may be in or outside B x l . This case creates a technical difficulty, which is avoided by choosing at random, thereby ensuring that the probability that the average payoff lies on the boundary of B x l is zero. From now on we fix an automaton A that is used by Player 1, and > 0. Our goal is to prove that there is N A ∈ such that
Step 2. An auxiliary Markov Chain. Denote by S the set of states of the automaton, and by s k the state of the automaton at stage k. Any mixed action q of Player 2 induces a Markov chain q over S, which reflects the evolution of the automaton when Player 2 plays at every stage (regardless of past play) the mixed action q. We denote by P A s q the probability over play paths induced by this Markov chain, when s ∈ S is the initial state of the automaton.
We will consider the Markov chain q l for every l = 1 L. The type of block k + 1 is determined according to whether the distance between the average payoff in block k and x l k is higher or lower than . Provided the block is sufficiently long, the average payoff along the block is close to the long-run average payoff in the Markov chain q l .
Step 3. Estimating Empirical Distribution Along a Block. By Seneta ([12, Theorem 4.7] ) there are constants C 1 > 0 and ∈ 0 1 (which depend on the automaton) such that for every l = 1 L, the probability that by stage k no irreducible subset 7 of q l is reached is at most C 1 k .
Note that the family of irreducible sets depends on q l . Denote by 1 k the event that an irreducible subset (in the respective Markov chain) is reached by stage k of block k, for every k ≥ k . By (13) , and because k∈ C 1 k < , there is K 1 ∈ such that P A s q l 1 K 1 ≥ 1 − /4. On 1 K 1 , in each block k ≥ K 1 the process spends at least k 4 stages in an irreducible subset. By Equation (1) (with = 1/ √ k), there is a constant C 2 > 0 such that for every l = 1 L, and every pair of states s s in the same irreducible set E of q l ,
where E l s is the invariant distribution of q l within E. Denote by E k the irreducible set to which the Markov chain q l k is absorbed. On 1 K 1 the set E k is defined for every k ≥ K 1 .
By Equation (14) , and because payoffs are bounded by one, with high probability the average payoff in the last k 4 stages of each block is within 1/ √ k of y E k l k
. In this case, the average payoff along the block is within
. Denote by X k the average payoff in block k. For every k ≥ K 1 let
By (14) there is K 2 ≥ K 1 such that P A * 2 K 2 ≥ 1 − /2. From now on we restrict ourselves to the event 2 K 2 .
Because there are finitely many irreducible sets, and because was chosen uniformly in the range 3 4 , one has, with probability one, > 0. Set K 0 = max K 2 4/ 2 4/ − 2 . In both Steps 5 and 6 we will use the fact that the ratio between the length of block k and the total length of the first k − 1 blocks goes to zero:
Step 6 The definition of * implies that the type of block k + 1 is chosen so as to maximize the difference between l and the fraction of stages spent so far in l-blocks.
We will now show that the fraction of stages spent in l-blocks converges to l . Denote by m l n n∈ the number of stages spent in l-blocks up to stage n.
Fix l ∈ 1 L , and consider the function n → m l n /n. If the type of the current block is not l, along the current block this function decreases. If the type of the current block is l, then at the beginning of the current block l − m l n /n was nonnegative, so that m l n /n ≤ l . In particular, at the end of the current block m l n /n ≤ l + k 4 + k /n, where k is the length of the block. We conclude that for every block k and every stage n along the block m l n n
By (16) the quantity k 4 + k /n goes to zero as n goes to infinity, so that indeed m l n /n converges to l . This implies that the average payoff is asymptotically in B z ⊆ B z . By the choice of , this set is disjoint of B F :
Step 7. Conclusion. Because is chosen uniformly in the interval 3/4 , the probability that for some 1 ≤ l ≤ L and some irreducible set E in q l the limit payoff y E l lies on the boundary of B x l is zero. Therefore, Equations (17) and (18) imply that
The desired result follows.
